Dated July, 1740.
"Thou shalt not steal."
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Subject: An unjust usurping
of our neighbor’s property without his consent is forbidden by the eighth
commandment.
This
is one of the ten commandments which constitute a summary of man’s duty, as
revealed by God. God made many revelations to the children of Israel in the
wilderness by Moses. But this made in the ten commandments is the chief. Most of
those other revelations contained ceremonial or judicial laws; but this contains
the moral law. The most of those other laws respected the Jewish nation; but
here is a summary of laws binding on all mankind. Those were to last till Christ
should come, and have set up the Christian church. These are of perpetual
obligation, and last to the end of the world. God everywhere, by Moses and the
prophets, manifests a far greater regard to the duties of these commands than to
any of the rites of the ceremonial law.
These commands were given at
Mount Sinai, before any of the precepts of the ceremonial or judicial laws. They
were delivered by a great voice out of the midst of fire, which made all the
people in the camp tremble, and afterwards were engraven on tables of stone, and
laid up in the ark; the first table containing the four first commandments;
which teach our duty to God; the second table containing the six last, which
teach our duty to man. The sum of the duties of the first table is contained in
that which Christ says is the first and great commandment of the law; Mat.
22:37, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy
soul, and with all thy mind.” The sum of what is required in the second table,
is what Christ calls the second command, like unto the first; verse 39, “The
second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.”
Of the commands of this
second table of the law, the first (which is the fifth of the ten),
refers to that honor which is due to our neighbor; the second respects
his life; the third his chastity; the fourth his estate;
the fifth his good name; the sixth and last respects his possessions and
enjoyments in general. It is that command which respects our neighbor’s estate,
and which is the fourth command of the second table, and the eighth of the whole
decalogue, on which I am now to insist. And here I shall make the command
itself, as the words of it lie before us in the decalogue, my subject: and as
the words of the commandment are in the form of a prohibition, forbidding a
certain kind of sin. So I shall consider particularly what it is that this
command forbids. The sin that is forbidden in this command is called stealing;
yet we cannot reasonably understand it only of that act, which in the more
ordinary and strict sense of the word, is called stealing. But the iniquity
which this command forbids, may be summarily expressed thus: — An unjust
usurping of our neighbor’s property, without his consent.
So much is doubtless
comprehended in the text; yet this comprehends much more than is implied in the
ordinary use of the word, stealing; which is only a secret taking of that
which is another’s from his possession, without either his consent or
knowledge. But the ten commands are not to be limited to the strictest sense of
the words, but are to be understood in such a latitude, as to include all things
that are of that nature or kind. Hence Christ reproves the Pharisees’
interpretation of the sixth command, Mat. 5:21, 22; and also their
interpretation of the seventh command; see verse 27, 28; by which it appears
that the commands are not to be understood as forbidding only these individual
sins, which are expressly mentioned, in the strictest sense of the expressions;
but all other things of the same nature or kind. — Therefore, what is
forbidden in this command is all unjust usurpation of our neighbor’s property.
Here it may be observed, that an unjust usurpation of our neighbor’s property
is twofold; it may be, either by withholding what is our neighbor’s, or
by taking it from him.
SECTION I
The dishonesty of
withholding what is our neighbor’s.
There are many ways in which
persons may unjustly usurp their neighbor’s property, by withholding what is
his due. But I shall particularize only two things.
First,
the unfaithfulness of men in not fulfilling their engagements. Ordinarily
when men promise anything to their neighbor, or enter into engagements by
undertaking any business with which their neighbor entrust them, their
engagements invest their neighbor with a right to that which is engaged; so that
if they withhold it, they usurp that which belongs to their neighbor. So, when
men break their promises, because they find them to be inconvenient, and they
cannot fulfill them without difficulty and trouble; or merely because they have
altered their minds since they promised. They think they have not consulted
their own interest in the promise which they have made, and that if they had
considered the matter as much before they promised as they have since, they
should not have promised. Therefore they take the liberty to set their own
promises aside. Besides, sometimes persons violate this command, by neglecting
to fulfill their engagements, through a careless, negligent spirit.
They violate this command,
in withholding what belongs to their neighbor, when they are not faithful in any
business which they have undertaken to do for their neighbor. If their neighbor
[has] hired them to labor for him for a certain time, and they be not careful
well to husband the time; if they be hired to a day’s labor, and be not
careful to improve the day, as they have reason to think that he who hired
justly expected of them; or if they be hired to accomplish such a piece of work,
and be not careful to do it well, do it not as if it were for themselves, or as
they would have others do for them, when they in like manner betrust them with
any business of theirs; or if they be entrusted with any particular affair,
which they undertake, but use not that care, contrivance, and diligence, to
manage it so as will be to the advantage of him who entrusts them, and as they
would manage it, or would insist that it should be managed, if the affair was
their own: in all these cases the unjustly withhold what belongs to their
neighbor.
Second,
another way in which men unjustly withhold what is their neighbor’s is in
neglecting to pay their debts. Sometimes this happens, because they run so
far into debt that they cannot reasonably hope to be able to pay their debts;
and this they do, either through pride and affectation of living above their
circumstances, or through a grasping, covetous disposition, or some other
corrupt principle. Sometimes they neglect to pay their debts from carelessness
of spirit about it, little concerning themselves whether they are paid or not,
taking no care to go to their creditor, or to send to him. And if they see him
from time to time, they say nothing about their debts. Sometimes they neglect to
pay their debts, because it would put them to some inconvenience. The reason why
they do it not, is not because they cannot do it, but because they cannot do it
so conveniently as they desire. And so they rather choose to put their creditor
to inconvenience by being without what properly belongs to him, than to put
themselves to inconvenience by being without what doth not belong to them, and
what they have no right to detain. In any of these cases they unjustly usurp the
property of their neighbor.
Sometimes persons have that
by them with which they could pay their debts if they would. But they want to
lay out their money for something else, to buy gay clothing for their children,
or to advance their estates, or for some such end. They have other designs in
hand, which must fail, if they pay their debts. When men thus withhold what is
due, they unjustly usurp what is not their own. Sometimes they neglect to pay
their debts, and their excuse for it is that their creditor doth not need it;
that he hath a plentiful estate, and can well bear to lie out of his money. But
if the creditor be ever so rich, that gives no right to the debtor to withhold
from him that which belongs to him. If it be due, it ought to be paid. For that
is the very notion of its being due. It is no more lawful to withhold from a man
what is his due, without his consent, because he is rich and able to do without
it, than it is lawful to steal from a man because he is rich, and able to bear
the loss.
SECTION II
The dishonesty of
unjustly taking a neighbor’s property.
The principal ways of doing
this seem to be these four, by negligence, by fraud, by violence, or by stealing
strictly so called.
First,
the first way of unjustly depriving our neighbor of that which is his, is by negligence,
by carelessly neglecting that which is expected by neighbors, one of
another, and is necessary to prevent our neighbor’s suffering in his estate by
us, or by anything that is ours: and necessary in order that neighbors may live
one by another, without suffering in their lawful interests, rights, and
possessions, one by another.
For instance, when proper
care is not taken by men to prevent their neighbor’s suffering in the produce
of his fields or enclosures, from their cattle, or other brute creatures; which
may be either through negligence with regard to their creatures themselves, in
keeping those that are unruly, and giving them their liberty, though they know
that they are not fit to have their liberty, and are commonly wont to break into
their neighbor’s enclosures greatly to his damage; or through a neglect of
that which is justly expected of them, to defend others’ fields from suffering
by the neighborhood of their own. In such cases men are guilty of unjustly
taking from their neighbor what is his property.
It is said in the law of
Moses, Exo. 22:5, “If a man shall cause a field or vineyard to be eaten, and
shall put in his beast, and shall feed in another man’s field; of the best of
his own field, and of the best of his vineyard, shall he make restitution.”
Now a man may be unjustly the cause of his neighbor’s field or vineyard being
eaten, either by putting in his beast, and so doing what he should not do; or by
neglecting to do what he should do, to prevent his beast from getting into his
field. What is said in the 144th Psalm, and two last verses, supposes that a
people who carry themselves as becomes a people whose God is the Lord, will take
thorough care that beasts do not break into their neighbor’s enclosures.
“That our oxen may be strong to labour; that there be no breaking in, nor
going out; that there be no complaining in our streets. Happy is that people
that is in such a case; yea happy is that people whose God is the Lord.”
Second,
taking away that which is our neighbor’s by fraud, or by deceiving him,
is another mode of usurping our neighbor’s property. This is the case when men
in their dealings take advantage of their neighbor’s ignorance, or oversight,
or mistake, to get something from him; or when they make their gains, by
concealing the defects of what they sell, putting off bad for good, though this
be not done by speaking falsely, but only by keeping silence. Or when they take
a higher price than what they sell is really worth, and more than they could get
for it if the concealed defects were known. Or when they sell that for good,
which indeed is not merchantable, which is condemned in Amos 8:6, “Yea, and
sell the refuse of the wheat.”
If a man puts off something
to another with defects that are concealed, knowing that the other receives it
as good, and pays such a price for it, under a notion of its having no
remarkable defect but what he sees, and takes the price which the buyer under
that notion offers; the seller knows that he takes a price of the buyer for that
which the buyer had not of him; for the buyer is deceived, and pays for those
things which he finds wanting in what he buys. It is just the same thing, as if
a man should take a payment that another offers him, through a mistake, for that
which he never had of him, thinking that he had it of him, when he had it not.
So a man fraudulently takes
away that which is his neighbor’s, when he gets his money from him by falsely
commending what he hath to sell, above what he knows to be the true quality of
it; and attributes those good qualities to it which he knows it has not. Or if
he does not that, yet sets forth the good qualities in a degree beyond what he
knows to be the true degree; or speaks of the defects and ill qualities of what
he has to sell, as if they were much less than he knows they are. Or on the
contrary, when the buyer will cry down what he is about to buy, contrary to his
real opinion of the value of it. — These things, however common they be in
men’s dealings one with another, are nothing short of iniquity, and fraud,
and a great breach of this commandment, upon which we are discoursing. Pro.
20:14, “It is nought, it is nought, saith the buyer; but when he is gone his
way then he boasteth.” — Many other ways there are whereby men deceive one
another in their trading, and whereby they fraudulently and unjustly take away
that which is their neighbor’s.
Third,
another mode of unjustly invading and taking away our neighbor’s property, is
by violence. This violence may be done in different degrees. — Men may
take away their neighbor’s goods either by mere open violence, either making
use of superior strength, forcibly taking away anything that is his; or by
express or implicit threatenings forcing him to yield up what he has into their
hands; as is done in open robbery and piracy. Or, by making use of some
advantages which they have over their neighbor, in their dealings with him,
constrain him to yield to their gaining unreasonably of him; as when they take
advantage of their neighbor’s poverty to extort unreasonably from him for
those things that he is under a necessity of procuring for himself or family.
This is an oppression against which God hath shown a great displeasure in his
word. Lev. 25:14, “And if thou sell ought unto thy neighbour, or buyest ought
of thy neighbour, ye shall not oppress one another.” Pro. 22:22, 23, “Rob
not the poor, because he is poor, neither oppress the afflicted in the gate; for
the Lord will plead their cause, and spoil the soul of those that spoiled
them.” And Amos 4:1, 2, “Hear this word, ye kine of Bashan, that are in the
mount of Samaria, which oppress the poor, which crush the needy, the Lord hath
sworn in his holiness, that he will take you away with hooks, and your posterity
with fishhooks.”
When the necessity of poor
indigent people is the very thing whence others take occasion to raise the price
of provisions, even above the market; this is such an oppression. There are many
poor people whose families are in such necessity of bread, that they in their
extremity will give almost any price for it, rather than go without it. Those
who have to sell, though hereby they have an advantage in their hands, yet
surely should not take the advantage to raise the price of provisions. We should
doubtless think we had just cause to complain, if we were in such necessity as
they are, and were reduced to their straits, and were treated in this manner.
And let us remember, that it is owing only to the distinguishing goodness of God
to us, that we are not in their circumstances. And whatever our present
circumstances are, yet we know not but that the time may still come when their
case may be ours.
Men may oppress others,
though they be not poor, if they will take advantage of any particular
necessities of their neighbor, unreasonably to extort from him. The case may be
so at particular seasons, that those who are not poor, may stand in particular
and extraordinary need of what we have, or what we can do for them. So that it
would be greatly to their disadvantage or loss to be without it. Now to take
advantage of their urgent circumstances, to get from them an unreasonable price,
is a violent dealing with our neighbors.
It is very unreasonable to
say, Such men are so rich, and get money so much more easily than I, that it is
no hurt for me to take advantage when they are in special need, and make them
give me, for work that I do for them, a great deal more than I would desire to
ask of other men. Let such consider, whether, if they should by any means
hereafter get forward in the world, and come to have plentiful estates, they
would like that persons should act upon such principles towards them. That men
are rich, gives us no more right to take away from them what is theirs in this
way, than it does to steal from them because they come easily by their property,
and can do without it better than we.
Again, another thing that is
a kind of violent taking from our neighbor what is his, is taking the advantage
of the law to gain from others, when their cause in honesty and conscience is
just and good. The circumstances of mankind, their rights, possessions, and
dealings one with another, are so various, that it is impossible that any body
of human laws should be contrived to suit all possible cases and circumstances.
Hence the best laws may be abused and perverted to purposes contrary to the
general design of laws, which is to maintain the rights and secure the
properties of mankind. Human laws have a regard due to them, but always in
subordination to the higher laws of God and nature. Therefore when it so
happens, that we have an advantage by the law, to gain what the laws of moral
honesty allow not, it is an oppression and violence to take the advantage. That
human laws allow it, will not excuse us before God, the Judge of the world, who
will judge us another day by his own laws and not by the laws of the
commonwealth.
Fourth,
the fourth way of unjustly taking from our neighbor that which is his, is stealing
so called. All unjust ways of taking away, or invading, or usurping what is our
neighbor’s, are called stealing in the most extensive use of the word, and all
in included in the expression in this command. Yet the word stealing, as it is
more commonly used, is not of so great extent, and intends not all unjust
invasion of our neighbor’s property, but only a particular kind of unjust
taking. So that in common speech when we speak of fraudulent dealings, of
extortion, unfaithfulness in our trust, and of stealing, we understand different
sins by these expressions, though they are an usurpation of what is our
neighbor’s.
Stealing, strictly so
called, may be thus defined. A designed taking of our neighbor’s goods from
him, without his consent or knowledge. It is not merely a withholding of
what is our neighbor’s, but a taking away. And therein it differs from
unfaithfulness in our undertakings and betrustments, and also from negligence in
the payment of debts. It is a designed or willful depriving of our neighbor of
what is his, and so differs from wronging our neighbor in his estate through
carelessness or negligence. It is taking of our neighbor’s goods without his
knowledge. It is a private, clandestine taking away, and so differs from robbery
by open violence.
So also it differs from
extortion, for in that the person knows what is taken from him. The aim of him
that takes is no other than that he should know it; for he makes use of other
means than his ignorance, to obtain what is his neighbors, viz. violence
to constrain him to give it up. So also it differs from fraudulent dealing or
trading. For though in fraudulent dealing, the lawful possessor doth not
understand the ways and means, by which he parts with his goods, and by which
his neighbor becomes possessed of them; yet he knows the fact; the
deceiver designedly conceals the manner only. But in stealing, strictly
so called, he that takes, intends not that it shall be known that he
takes. It also differs from extortion and fraudulent dealing, in that it is
wholly without the consent of the owner. For in extortion, though there be no
free consent; yet the consent of the owner is in some sort gained, though by
oppressive means. So in fraudulent dealing consent is in some sort obtained,
though it be by deceit. But in stealing no kind of consent is obtained.
A person may steal from
another, yet not take his goods without the knowledge of the owner; because he
may know of it accidentally, he may see what is done, unawares to the thief.
Therefore I have defined stealing, a designed taking without the consent or
knowledge of the owner. If it be accidentally known, yet it is not known in the
design and intention of the thief. The thief is so far at least private in it,
that he gives no notice to the owner at the time. It must be also without the
consent of the owner. A person may take without the knowledge of the owner, and
yet not take without his consent. The owner may not know of his taking at the
time, or of his taking any particular things; yet there may be his implicit
consent. There may have been a general consent, if not expressed, yet implied.
The circumstances of the affair may be such, that his consent may well be
presumed upon, either from an established custom, allowed by all, or from the
nature of the case; the thing being of such a nature, that it may well be
presumed that none would refuse their consent; as in the case of a person’s
accidentally passing through his neighbor’s vineyard in Israel, and eating his
fill of grapes; or from the circumstances of the persons, as is the case, in
many instances, of the freedom which near neighbors and intimate friends often
take, and of that boldness which they use with respect to each other’s goods.
In all such cases,
though the owner [does] not particularly know what is done, yet he that takes,
does it not with any contrived designed concealment. And though there is no
express, particular consent, yet there is a consent either implied, or justly
presumed upon. And he that takes, doth not designedly do it without consent.
It may happen in some cases,
that one may take the goods of another both without his knowledge and consent,
either explicit or implicit, but through mistake; yet he may not be guilty of
stealing. Therefore the design of him who takes must come into
consideration. When he designedly takes away that which is his neighbor’s,
without his consent or knowledge, then he steals. So that if it should happen,
that he has both his consent and knowledge, without his design, he steals. And
if it so happen that he takes without either his neighbor’s consent or
knowledge, and yet without his own design, he steals not. I desire therefore
that this, which I take to be the true definition of theft or stealing, may be
borne in mind, viz. a designed taking of our neighbor’s goods, without
his consent or knowledge; because it is needful to clear up many things which I
have yet to say on this subject.
SECTION III
Dishonest
excuses.
Here I shall
particularly take notice of some things, by which persons may be ready to excuse
themselves, in privately taking their neighbor’s good, which however cannot be
a just excuse for it, nor will they make such a taking to be stealing.
First,
that the person whose goods are privately taken, owes or is in debt to
him that takes them. Some may be ready to say that they do not take that which
is their neighbor’s, they take that which is their own, because as much is due
to them, their neighbor owes them as much, and unjustly detains it, and they
know not whether ever they shall get their due of him. Their neighbor will not
do them right, and therefore they must right themselves.
But such pleas as
these will not justify a man in going in a private and clandestine manner to
take away anything of his neighbor’s from his possession, without his consent
or knowledge; his doing this is properly stealing. For though something of his
neighbor’s, which is as valuable as what he takes, may be due to him; that
doth not give him such a right to his neighbor’s goods, that he may take
anything that is his, according to his own pleasure, and at what time and in
what manner he pleases. That his neighbor is in debt to him, doth not give him a
right to take it upon himself to be his own judge, so that he may judge for
himself, which of his neighbor’s goods shall be taken from him to discharge
the debt; and that he may act merely according to his own private judgment and
pleasure in such a case, without so much as acquainting his neighbor with the
affair.
In order to warrant
such a proceeding as this, everything that his neighbor has, must be his. A man
may not take indifferently what he pleases out of a number of goods, without the
consent or knowledge of any other person, unless all is his own, to be disposed
of as he pleases. Such a way of using goods according to our own pleasure,
taking what we will, and at what time we will, can be warranted by nothing but a
dominion over the whole. And though he who is in debt may be guilty of great
injustice in detaining what is due to another; yet it doth not thence follow,
but that he that takes from him, may also be guilty of great injustice towards
him. The course he takes to right himself may be very irregular and
unreasonable; and such a course, that if universally allowed and pursued in such
cases, would throw human society into confusion.
When men obtain a
property in any of the professions of this life, they are at the same time also
invested with a right to retain a possession of them, till they are deprived of
them in some fair and regular proceeding. Every man has a right to hold his
estate, and keep possession of his properties, so that no other can lawfully use
them as his own, until he either parts with them of his own accord, or until it
be taken from him according to some established rule, in a way of open justice.
Therefore he who, under pretense of having just demands upon his neighbor,
privately takes his goods without his consent, takes them unjustly, and is
guilty of stealing.
Second,
much less will it make such a private taking not to be stealing, that he who
takes, has, in way of kindness or gift, done for the person from whom he takes,
as much is equivalent to the value of what he takes. If a man do his
neighbor some considerable kindness, whether in labor, or in something that he
gives him, what he does or gives is supposed to be done voluntarily, and he is
not to make his neighbor debtor for it. And therefore if anything be privately
taken away, upon any such consideration, it is gross stealing.
For instance, when
any person needs to have any services done for him, where a considerable number
of hands are necessary; it is common for the neighborhood to meet together and
join in helping their neighbor, and frequently some provision is made for their
entertainment. If any person who hath assisted on such an occasion, and is a
partaker at such an entertainment, shall think within himself, the service I
have done is worth a great deal more than what I shall eat and drink here, and
therefore shall take liberty privately to take of the provision set before him,
to carry away with him, purposely concealing the matter from him who hath
entertained him, this is gross stealing. And it is a very ridiculous plea which
they make to excuse so unmanly and vile an act.
Persons in such
cases may say to themselves, that the provision is made for them, and set before
them; that it is a time wherein considerable liberty is given, and they think,
seeing they have done so much for their host, they may take something more than
they eat and drink there. But then let them be open in it; let them acquaint
those with it who make the entertainment; and let it not be done in any wise, in
a secret, clandestine manner, with the least design or attempt to avoid their
notice. On the contrary, let care be taken to give them notice and obtain their
consent.
When persons do
such things in a private manner, they condemn themselves by their own act. Their
doing what they do secretly, shows that they are conscious to themselves, that
they go beyond what it is expected they should do, and do what would not be
allowed, if it were known. Such an act, however light they may make of it, is
abominable theft, and what any person of religion or any sense of the dignity of
their own nature, would to the greatest degree abhor and detest.
Third,
it is not sufficient to make a private taking without consent not to be
stealing, that it is but a small matter that is taken. If the thing be of little
value, yet if it be worth a purposed concealing from the owner, the value is
great enough to render the taking of it proper theft. If it be pretended that
the thing is of so small consequence, that it is not worth asking for; then
surely it is not worth a purposed concealing from the owner, when it is taken.
He who, under this pretense, conceals his taking, in the very act contradicts
his own pretense; for his action shows that he apprehends, or at least suspects,
that, as small a matter as it is, the owner would not like the taking of it, if
he knew it; otherwise the taker would not desire to conceal it.
The owner of the
goods, and not other people, is the proper judge, whether what he owns be of
such a value, that it is worth his while to keep it, and to refuse his consent
to the taking of it from him. He who possesses, and not he who takes away, has a
right to judge of what consequence his possessions are to him. He has a right to
set what value he pleases on them, and to treat them according to that value.
Besides, merely that a thing is of small value, cannot give a right to others,
purposely and designedly to take it away, without the knowledge or consent of
the owner. Because if this only gives a right, then all have a right to take
things of small value; and at this rate a great number of persons, each of them
taking from a man that which is of small value, might take away all he has.
Therefore, it will
not justify persons, in purposely taking such things as fruit from the trees, or
gardens, or fields of their neighbors, without their knowledge or consent, that
the things which they take are things of small value. Nor is that sufficient to
render such an act not an act of theft properly so called. This shows also that
the smallness of the value of what is privately taken at feasts and
entertainments, doth not render the taking of such things not stealing.
The small value of
a thing may in some cases justify an occasional taking of things, so far as we
may from thence, and from what is generally allowed, reasonably presume that the
owner gives his consent. But if that be the case, and persons really take, as
supposing that the owner consents to such occasional taking, then he that takes
will not at all endeavor to do what he does secretly, nor in any measure to
avoid notice. But merely the smallness of the value of a thing, can never
justify a secret taking of what is another’s.
SECTION IV
The subject
applied. — The dishonest warned.
The first use I
would make of this doctrine, is to warn against all injustice and
dishonesty, as to what appertains to our neighbor’s temporal goods or
possessions. Let me warn all to avoid all ways of unjustly invading or usurping
what is their neighbor’s, and let me press that exhortation of the apostle,
Rom. 12:17, “Provide things honest in the sight of all men;” which implies,
that those things which we provide for ourselves, and use as our own, should be
such as we come honestly by; and especially that we should avoid all clandestine
or underhand ways of obtaining anything that is our neighbor’s, either
by fraudulent dealing, or by that taking without our neighbor’s knowledge and
consent, of which we have been speaking.
I warn you to
beware of dishonesty in withholding what is your neighbor’s, either by
unfaithfulness to your trust in any business which you undertake, or by
withholding your neighbor’s just and honest dues. Consider that saying of the
apostle, Rom. 13:8, “Owe no man any thing, but to love one another.” Be also
warned against wronging your neighbor or injuring him in his enclosures, or in
any of his just rights and properties, through careless neglect of what is
reasonably expected by neighbors one of another, in order that they may live one
by another without mutual injury. Let all beware that they bring not guilt on
their souls in the sight of God, by taking an advantage to oppress any person.
Especially beware of taking advantage of others’ poverty to extort from them.
For God will defend their cause, and you will be no gainers by such oppression.
Beware also of all
injustice by deceitful and fraudulent dealing. You doubtless meet with abundance
of temptation to fraud, and have need to keep a strong guard upon yourselves.
There are many temptations to falsehood in trading, both about what you would
buy and what you have to sell. There are, in buying, temptations to do as in
Pro. 20:14, “It is nought, it is nought, saith the buyer.” There are many
temptations to take indirect courses, to blind those with whom you deal, about
the qualities of what you have to sell, to diminish the defects of your
commodities, or to conceal them, and to put off things for good, which are bad.
And there are doubtless many other ways that men meet with temptations to
deceive others, which your own experience will better suggest to you than I can.
But here I shall
take occasion to speak of a particular kind of fraud, which is very aggravated,
and is rather a defrauding of God than man. What I mean is, the giving of
that which is bad for good in public contributions. Though it be matter of
great shame and lamentation that it should be so, yet it is to be feared, from
what has sometimes been observed, that there are some who, when there is a
public contribution to be made for the poor, or some other pious and charitable
use, sometimes take that opportunity to put off their bad money. That
which they find, or think, their neighbors will refuse to take at their hands,
because they will have opportunity to see what is offered them, and to observe
the badness of it, even that they therefore take opportunity to put off
to God.
Hereby they
endeavor to save their credit; for they apprehend that they shall be concealed.
They appear with others to go to the contribution, as it is not known, but that
they put in that which is good. But they cheat the church of God, and defraud
the expectations of the poor, or rather, they lie to God, for those who receive
what is given, stand as Christ’s receivers, and not as acting for themselves
in this matter.
They that do thus,
do that which is very much of the same nature with that sin, against which God
denounces that dreadful curse in Mal. 1:14, “Cursed be the deceiver which hath
in his flock a male, and voweth and sacrificeth unto the Lord a corrupt thing:
for I am a great King, saith the Lord of hosts, and my name is dreadful among
the heathen.” That hath in his flock a male, i.e. That has in his flock
that which is good and fit to be offered to God. For it was the male of the
flock principally that was appointed, in the law of Moses, to be offered in
sacrifice. He has in his flock that which is good, but he vows and sacrifices to
the Lord “the torn, the lame, and the sick.” As it is said in the foregoing
verse; ye said also, “Behold what a weariness is it, and ye have snuffed at
it, saith the Lord of hosts; and ye brought that which was torn, and the lame,
and the sick; thus ye brought an offering: should I accept this of your hands?
Saith the Lord.”
Contributions in
the Christian church come in the room of sacrifices in the Jewish church. Mercy
comes in the room of sacrifice. And what is offered in the way of mercy is as
much offered to God, as the sacrifices of old were. For what is done to the poor
is done to Christ, and he that hath pity on the poor, lendeth to the Lord; Pro.
19:17. The Jews that offered the sick and lame of the flock, knew that if they
had offered it to their governor, and had attempted to put it off, as part of
the tribute or public taxes due to their earthly rulers, it would not be
accepted, and therefore they were willing to put it off to God. “And if ye
offer the blind for sacrifice, is it not evil? And if ye offer the lame and
sick, is it not evil? Offer it now unto thy governor, will he be pleased with
thee, or accept thy person? Saith the Lord of hosts.”
So those persons
who purposely put bad money into contributions, know that what they put in would
not be accepted if they should offer to pay their public taxes. Yea, they know
that their neighbors would not accept it at their hands; and therefore
they are willing to save themselves, by putting it off to God.
This practice has
also very much of the nature of the sin of Ananias and Sapphira. What they
offered was by way of contribution for charitable uses. The brethren sold what
they had, and brought it into a common stock, and put all under the care of
deacons, that the poor might every one be supplied. Ananias and Sapphira brought
a part of their possessions, and put it into the common stock. And their sin
was, that they put it in for more than it really was. It was but a part of what
they had, and they put it in, and would have it accepted, as if it had been all.
So those among us, of whom I am speaking, put off what they put into the
charitable stock, for more than it is. For they put it in, under the notion that
it is something of some value. They intend it shall be so taken by the church
that sees them go to the contribution, when indeed they put in nothing at all.
Ananias and
Sapphira were charged with lying to God, and doing an act of fraud towards God
himself, in what they did. Acts 5:4, “Whilst it remained, was it not thine
own? And after it was sold, was it not in thine own power? Why hast thou
conceived this thing in thine heart? Thou hast not lied unto men, but unto
God.” So those who knowingly put bad money for good into a contribution for a
charitable use, as much as in them lies commit an act of fraud and deceit
towards God. For the deacons who receive what is contributed, receive it not in
their own names, but as Christ’s receivers. I hope these things may be
sufficient to deter every reader from ever daring to do such a thing for the
future.
Again, another
thing I would warn you against, is, stealing, properly and strictly so called;
or designedly taking away any of your neighbor’s goods without his consent or
knowledge. And especially I would now take occasion to warn against a practice
which is very common in the country, particularly among children and young
people; and that is, stealing fruit from their neighbor’s trees or enclosures.
There is a licentious liberty taken by many children and young people, in making
bold with their neighbor’s fruit. And it is to be feared, that they are too
much countenanced in it by their parents and many elder people.
I am sensible, that
the great thing which is pleaded, and made very much the ground of this liberty
which is taken and so much tolerated, is a very abusive and unreasonable
construction and application of that text of Scripture in Deu. 23:24, “When
thou comest into thy neighbour’s vineyard, then thou mayest eat grapes thy
fill. But thou shalt not put any in thy vessel.” Because this text seems to be
so much mistaken and misimproved, I shall therefore endeavor particularly to
state the matter of persons taking their neighbor’s fruit, and to set it in a
just and clear light as concerning this text.
It was to eat their
fill of grapes when they occasionally came into or passed through their
neighbor’s vineyard, and not that they should go thither on purpose to
eat grapes. This is manifest by the manner of expression; “When thou comest
into thy neighbour’s vineyard, thou mayest eat;” i.e. when thou art
come thither on some other occasion. If God had meant to give them leave to come
thither on purpose, for no other end, it would not have been expressed so; but
rather thus, Thou mayest come into thy neighbour’s vineyard, and eat
grapes thy fill. — Such were the circumstances of that people, and vineyards
among them were so common, that there was no danger that this liberty would be
attended with ill consequence. It is manifest throughout the history of Israel,
that vineyards among them were so common that the people in general had them.
Every husbandman among them was a vine-dresser; and a great part of the business
of a husbandman among them, consisted in dressing and taking care of his
vineyards. Grapes seem to have been the most common sort of fruit that they had.
Besides, there was no liberty given for persons to go on purpose to a vineyard
to eat the fruit of it. So that there was no danger of neighbors suffering one
by another, by any such liberty. — The liberty did not tend to any such
consequence, as the flocking of a great number to eat grapes, whereby the fruit
of the vineyard might be much diminished.
Such were the
circumstances of the case, that the consent of the owners of vineyards in
general might well be presumed upon, though no such express liberty had been
given. You may remember that in the definition of stealing, I observed, that
explicit consent is not always necessary; because the case may be so
circumstanced, that consent may be well presumed on. And the reason why consent
might well be presumed on in the case of eating grapes, of which we are now
speaking, is, that there could be no sensible injury, nor any danger of any ill
consequences, by which a man would sensibly suffer in the benefit of his
vineyard. Hence it is the more easy to determine, what would and what would not
be justified by this text, among us. Suppose a particular person among us had a
vineyard of the same kind with those which the children of Israel had, it would
not justify others in using the same liberty when occasionally passing through
it; because it would be a rare thing, and the rarity and scarcity of the fruit
would render it of much greater value. Besides, if one man [was] distinguished
by such a possession, to allow of such a liberty would have a much greater
tendency to ill consequences, than if they were common, as they were in the land
of Canaan. There would be danger of many persons falsely pretending, and making
occasions, to pass through the vineyard, for the sake of such rare fruit.
Nor would it be a
parallel case, if men in general among us had each of them a few vines.
That would be a very different thing from persons in general having large
vineyards. Nor would this text, in such a case, warrant men’s eating their
fill of grapes when occasionally passing by. — And though all in general had
vineyards, as they had in the land of Canaan, this text would not justify men in
going into their neighbor’s vineyard on purpose to eat the fruit. No such
liberty is given in the text. If there had been such liberty, it might have been
of ill consequence. For the sake of saving their own grapes, men might make a
practice of going and sending their children into their neighbor’s vineyard,
to eat their fill from time to time.
But the liberty
given in this text to the children of Israel, seems to be very parallel with the
liberty taken among us, to take up an apple or two and eat, as we are
occasionally passing through a neighbor’s orchard; which, as our circumstances
are, we may do, and justly presume that we have the owner’s consent. This is a
liberty that we take, and find no ill consequences. It was very much so with
vineyards in the land of Canaan, as it is with orchards among us. Apples in some
countries are a rare fruit. And there it would by no means be warrantable for
persons to take the same liberty when occasionally passing by their neighbor’s
apple tree, which we warrantably take here, when going through a neighbor’s
orchard.
The consideration
of these things will easily show the great abuse that is made of this text, when
it is brought to justify such a resorting of children and others to their
neighbor’s fruit trees, as is sometimes, on purpose to take and eat the fruit.
Indeed this practice is not only not justified by the law of Moses, but it is in
itself unreasonable, and contrary to the law of nature. The consequences of it
are pernicious, so that a man can have no dependence on enjoying the fruit of
his labor, or the benefit of his property in those things, which possibly he may
very much value. He can have no assurance but that he shall be mainly deprived
of what he has, and that others will not have the principal benefit of it; and
so that his end in planting and cultivating that from which he expected those
fruits of the earth, which God hath given for the use, comfort, and delight of
mankind, will not be in the main frustrated.
SECTION V
An
exhortation to honesty.
Under this use, I
shall confine myself to two particulars, many other things having been already
spoken to.
First,
I shall hence take occasion to exhort parents to restrain the children
from stealing, and particularly from being guilty of theft in stealing the
fruits of their neighbor’s trees or fields. Christian parents are obliged to
bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. But how much
otherwise do they act, who bring them up in theft! And those parents are guilty
of this, who — though they do not directly teach them to steal, by example and
setting them about it, yet — tolerate them in it.
Parents should take
effectual care, not only to instruct their children better, and to warn them
against any such thievish practices, but also thoroughly to restrain them.
Children who practice stealing, make themselves vile. Stealing, by the common
consent of mankind, is a very vile practice. Therefore those parents that will
not take thorough care to restrain their children from such a practice, will be
guilty of the same sin which God so highly resented, and awfully punished, in
Eli, of which we read, 1 Sam. 3:13, “For I have told him, that I will judge
his house for ever, for the iniquity which he knoweth; because his sons made
themselves vile, and he restrained them not.”
Second,
I exhort those who are conscious in themselves that they have heretofore wronged
their neighbor to make restitution. This is a duty the obligation to
which is exceedingly plain. If a person was wronged in taking away
anything that was his, certainly he is wronged also in detaining it. And
all the while that a person, who has been guilty of wronging his neighbor,
neglects to make restitution, he lives in that wrong. He not only lives
impenitent as to that first wrong of which he was guilty, but he continually
wrongs his neighbor. A man who hath gotten anything from another wrongfully, goes
on to wrong him every day that he neglects to restore it, when he has
opportunity to do it. The person injured did not only suffer wrong from the
other when his goods were first taken from him, but he suffers new injustice
from him all the while they are unjustly kept from him.
Therefore I counsel
you who are conscious that you have heretofore wronged your neighbor, either by
fraud, or oppression, or unfaithfulness, or stealing, whether lately or
formerly, though it may have been a great while ago, speedily to go and make
restitution for all the wrong your neighbor has suffered at your hands. That it
was done long ago, doth not quit you from obligation to restore. This is a duty
with which you must comply; you cannot be acquitted without it. As long as you
neglect it, it will be unreasonable in you to expect any forgiveness of God. For
what ground can you have to think that God will pardon you, as long as you
willfully continue in the same wrong, and wrong the same many still every day,
by detaining from him that which is his? You in your prayers ask of God, that he
would forgive all your sins; but your very prayers are mockery, if you still
willfully continue in those sins. — Indeed, if you go and confess your faults
to your neighbor, and he will freely acquit you from making restitution, you
will be acquitted from the obligation. For in so doing, your neighbor gives you
what before was his. But otherwise you cannot be acquitted.
I would leave this
advice with all, for direction in their behavior on their deathbeds. Indeed you
should not by any means put it off till you come to die; and you will run the
most fearful risk in so doing. But if you will not do it now, while you are in
health, I will leave it with you to remember, when you shall come to lie on your
deathbeds. Doubtless, then if you have the use of your reason, you will be
concerned for the salvation of your poor souls. And let this be one thing then
remembered, as absolutely necessary in order to your salvation, that before you
die, you must make restitution for whatever wrong you shall have done any of
your neighbors; or at least leave orders that such restitution be made.
Otherwise you will, as it were, go out of the world, and go before your great
Judge, with stolen goods in your hands. And certainly it will not be very
comfortable or safe, to bring them into his infinitely holy and dreadful
presence, when he sits on his throne of judgment, with his eyes as a flame of
fire, being more pure than to look on iniquity; when he is about to sentence you
to your everlasting unalterable state.
Added to Bible Bulletin Board's Jonathan Edwards Collection by:
Tony Capoccia
Bible Bulletin Board
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